1) What were the time periods when the Source knew or had exposure to JARUZELESKI?

My appraisal and opinions about JARUZELESKI are based on personal observations of his attitudes, behavior and style for a period of over 25 years. These cover a variety of times of his spectacular career, starting at the point when he became a divisional commander, and moving through a series of eras in which he held higher and higher military positions such as: the Chief of Main Political Directorate (Główny Zarząd Polityczny), Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, and Minister of National Defense. It also covers the time when he achieved the highest levels of national power as the Prime Minister of the Government of PPR, and the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PZPR. Lastly, it includes the time of the formulation of the final plans for the total takeover of the political and military power via creation of the Military Council of National Salvation (RWRON), and introduction of the martial law, during the period of the social crisis in the Peoples' Republic of Poland.

I first encountered the name JARUZELESKI in the early fifties, at the moment which one could consider, in a certain sense, a kind of dramatic beginning of his subsequent spectacular career.

In the summer of 1951, when I took my entry exam to the Higher School for Infantry in REMBERTOW (WSP or Wyzsza Szkoła Piechoty), I heard a rare story about a certain previous year (1950/51) graduate of this institution, by the then still unknown name of JARUZELESKI, who in the period of only several days was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and then to Colonel.
Briefly, this was the situation: Major JARUZELSKI, who had finished a year-long course for regimental commanders, very much like his contemporaries attending the WSP, received a routine promotion to Lieutenant Colonel. The festive graduation ceremonies were attended by the then Commander of the Land Forces, the Vice-Minister of National Defense, Lt. General S. POPLAWSKI (a Soviet General in Polish uniform). During the banquet, the general inquired about the outstanding graduates. When the school's commandant (also a Soviet general in Polish uniform) Brig. Gen. STECIĆ introduced to him JARUZELSKI, at that time already a Lt. Col., and the top graduate, POPLAWSKI, supposedly somewhat high from drinking, congratulated JARUZELSKI, and assured him that he will be promoted to Colonel. A few days later, there appeared the order of the then Minister of National Defense, Marshal of Poland and USSR, ROSSOVSKIIY, promoting JARUZELSKI to Colonel.

It is difficult to say whether this accelerated promotion was accidental, as it was told at the time, or rather a result of specific preference which already then was being lavished upon JARUZELSKI by the Soviet leadership of the Ministry of National Defense of the Polish Peoples' Republic.

JARUZELSKI, as the faculty claimed, distinguished himself in all subjects and his first recognition was fully deserved. Without denigrating any basis for this particular singling out of JARUZELSKI, one ought not ignore the fact, in properly evaluating this occurrence, that the period of time in which this took place was one of the most gloomy in the postwar history of the Polish Peoples' Army. It was an era of a ruthless russification of the armed forces of the Polish Peoples' Republic. It was the time of fabricated political trials which not infrequently ended in death sentences, and removal
of the cadre of the prewar commanders and politically uncertain personalities on the one hand, and accelerated advancement and pushing ahead for responsible position of the hard-headed marxist-leninist doctrinaires and, before all, proven friends of the USSR, on the other hand.

I never heard whether JARUZELSKY at that time personally participated, as was then in current fashion, in the campaign against real or imaginary opponents of the system. He supposedly, was, however, very active and involved politically and this attracted the attention not only of his contemporaries but also of the Soviet supervisors who were deciding about everything that happened in the Polish Armed Forces.

I was able to meet JARUZELSKY personally only a few years later. In the autumn of 1957 JARUZELSKY was appointed as the Commander of the Twelfth Mechanized Division in SZCZECIN, and I, as the Commanding officer of the First Battalion in the Fifth Mechanized Regiment which fell under his command, in the very same city. Our acquaintanship did not, at that time, exceed routine duty encounters between a divisional and battalion commanders. It was not JARUZELSKY's habit to command particular battalions "over the heads" of regimental commanders. However, because of the poor condition of that division (which received a failing grade during an inspection, and its former commander, Col. MAJTEK was removed for cause from his command), JARUZELSKY was a frequent visitor in the regiment, and in the barracks, as well as in the drill area. He also had frequent formal briefings with the participation of battalion commanders and had undertaken a variety of steps leading to the achievement by his division (which he did not hide) of the first place within the Polish Armed Forces.

In this time, which, inter alia, lasted not quite a year - I was
transferred at my own request (for personal reasons), to the 28th Mechanized Regiment of the Eighth Mechanized Division in KOLEBZEC, I had relatively frequent, though certainly only superficial opportunity to observe, and to form an opinion about JARUZELSKI as my divisional commander. Common duty in the same division, however, had no influence on our subsequent, much closer association.

In 1958 our roads parted. At the time when he continued to command the Twelfth Mechanized Division and I served in the Eighth Mechanized Division, our contacts were sporadic and limited to accidental encounters during military maneuvers, official briefings and Party Conferences in the Pomeranian Military District.

At the time when JARUZELSKI was the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Polish Armed Forces, my contacts with him were even more infrequent. Therefore, my opinions about him during that period of time are largely based on the observation and appraisal of the activities of the Main Political Directorate which JARUZELSKI headed, as well as on the statements and opinions of the people who were his direct subordinates, and who later belonged to the circle of my colleagues and co-workers, who shared with me their various views about him.

My direct working relationship with JARUZELSKI had actually began in 1965, after his takeover of the position of the Chief of General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces in which I was then already working. Physically, I was relatively close to him since my workroom was located in the same corridor as the offices of JARUZELSKI, separated from me by only four other offices.

My personal contacts with JARUZELSKI, however, were in the beginning limited to the affairs concerning training of the armed forces, including
especially plans for large military exercises at the level of front, and of
various branches of the armed forces, in the preparation of which I took an
active part as a co-author, and subsequently, the author. It was at that time
that I began writing for him a variety of staff studies, including drafts of
exercise critiques, inserts to his presentations before the directing cadre of
the armed forces (Kierownicza Kadra Sił Zbrojnych), plans of Ministry of
National Defense, directives for training of the armed forces, and other
material, as I was directed.

At the moment when JARUZELSKI became the Minister of National Defense
my encounters with him were not only unrestricted but indeed began to
everpass wider and wider areas of problems. In the early seventies I was
even asked to take over, in his office, the post of the senior officer for
Special Activities of the ministry of National Defense with the possibility of
promotion to the position of the Chief of Staff of the office of the Ministry
of National Defense. Because I disliked writing Staff studies for his
presentation (which was supposed to have been my main responsibility), I
declined despite the repetition of the offer.

Being promoted in turn, in the General Staff of the Polish Armed
Forces, I reached a position which enabled me to learn to know this man much
better from many sided aspects, than would have been possible had I only held
the function of an officer for Special Activities. An attendant circumstance,
which favored this situation was the fact that in the opinion of the
leadership in the General Staff of Polish Armed Forces, the Staff studies
prepared by me personally were, if not altogether applauded by JARUZELSKI, at
least received from him a positive appraisal, which was not easy.

In this manner, not considering my formal responsibilities which
resulted from my official position, I was receiving a great quantities of materials and documents which were being submitted by the General Staff to JARUZELSKI. In the finishing touches of certain important documents I actually worked under the direct supervision of JARUZELSKI, bypassing my direct supervisors.

In the spring of 1977, I was appointed as the Chief of Department I of the Strategic Defense Planning, Directorate I of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces. In connection with this, my responsibilities encompassed participation in operational (war) planning, and the total military cooperation of the Polish Peoples' Republic with the allies of the Warsaw Pact. From that moment on, actually on the basis of exclusivity, I not only prepared all relevant materials and documents but also accompanied JARUZELSKI, as a member of the delegations of the Polish Armed Forces, to all meetings of the military organs of the Warsaw Pact, and also to all bilateral negotiations and discussions with the military leadership of the USSR.

In the summer of 1980, in connection with the social crisis in Poland, only I, in addition to the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PWP, certain members of the Politbureau, and the narrow leadership of the Ministry of National Defense, participated in the formulation of the plans to introduce the martial law in Poland. In addition to this, I also participated in the preparations of the briefing and information on that subject for the Soviet leadership. As these plans crystallized, sometime from the spring 1981, until my departure from Poland, I was the chief of the Team which planned the martial law in Poland. It was this position which provided me with an opportunity to appraise the attitude of JARUZELSKI regarding the issue of methods for the resolution of the crisis in Poland.
2. How well did you know JARUZELSKI? How frequent were your contacts?

JARUZELSKI, while unusually eloquent, was a very withdrawn person who shut himself off from other people. He never acted spontaneously and all his important pronouncements were, as a rule, composed, and thought through in advance, in the solitude of his study. At times, they were even rehearsed using a recorder, before they were officially pronounced. Of course, he did not avoid "live" statements, comments, thoughtful remarks and discussions but always, and in every situation, he never lost control over the real content of his pronouncements.

Could I then, in this instance say that I know the man sufficiently well? I believe I can. It seems to me that I not only know his demeanor, behavior, style and method of work but also, to a large extend, the attitudes and motives which guided his conduct.

I kept encountering him, I listened to his statements, and I continued to observe his behavior in a variety of situations and settings on more than several hundreds of occasions. I spoke with him directly or briefed him about various problems umpteen times. A dozen or so times I accompanied him to difficult talks and negotiations with the military leaders of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact.

Though, my direct contacts with JARUZELSKI gave me a wide field of observation, it is of no less importance that for about 5-7 Years I worked in the "kitchen", which "brewed", as JARUZELSKI himself was fond to say, his most important decisions. In the last period of the time I even became the only "chef" who prepared the most difficult and the most sensitive decisions. For that reason, I had a nearly daily working contact with SIWICKI, who was the chief of the "kitchen", and the only confidant of JARUZELSKI, as well as with
all the personnel of the Polish "White House" with Gen. JANISZEWSKI (Maj.Gen. Michal) at its head.

SIWICKI was a much more open man who occasionally shared with me his feelings about reactions of JARUZELSKI. JANISZEWKI too, behaved in a similar fashion. In addition, participating directly in the decision processes, I had the opportunity to become acquainted with not only the final official positions of JARUZELSKI but also to watch the paths which he followed to arrive at these positions.

I, therefore, feel that all this entitles me to make judgments which could, to a certain degree, provide a more objective appraisal of this controversial, and in the eyes of many politicians, still not completely defined personality.

3. Did you like or dislike JARUZELSKI?

I worked in an environment in which, with the exception of very few who were loyal to him, people, behaved toward him in a negative fashion, disliked him or even held him in contempt, for a variety of reasons and views.

For fundamental political reasons, I never belonged to the circle of his followers. I cannot state, however, that I did not respect him as a man, or that I did not like him. JARUZELSKI was a towering personality, who clearly stood out from his hopelessly primitive environment. Certain of his personal qualities indeed impressed me, especially in the moral and ethical sphere, in which there was a consistence between his words and deeds. Also impressive were his exceptional attention to work coupled with an unusual intellectual receptivity (a continual hunger for knowledge), a rarely encountered analytical and synthetical ability, originality of thought, a high degree of culture in his language, both oral and written, as well as the
highest demands which he placed upon himself and those in his immediate entourage.

Valuing these positive attributes, I became simultaneously aware of many negative features, among these, in the forefront, was a weakness of his character bordering on cowardice, and an artificial, pompous way of life. While his behavior never perturbed me, I never had any sympathy for him.

4. How did JARUZELSKI delegate his authority?

JARUZELSKI has an inborn instinct for discipline and obedience combined within an instilled worship for power. Having a nearly maniacal respect for power, he never sought it through the "back door" via participation in political plays or "elbowing" himself forward. On the contrary, he was often reluctant to accept higher and higher government posts which were offered to him because of waves of changing development. One could not say, on the other hand that he shied away from power. Gradually, it became not only his all absorbing passion but also his first and only love. The cult of power and the ecstasy which he experienced in exercising it resulted in the situation in which once having achieved power he never shared it with anyone else.

He divided responsibility very precisely. He even reached a certain level of mastery in the exploitation of the typical forms of the "democratic socialism", "collectivism" and all kinds of "consultations" for the absolute control of his sphere of power without revealing his own views.
Did he easily delegate important details to others or did he try to oversee as much as possible personally?

The weight of responsibility which JANZELSKI felt he carried, caused him to extend personal supervision over every possible issue. He was not, however, a slave of this attitude. He was well organized and systematic and approached various issues selectively, taking into consideration the situation which existed, and the executive capabilities of his subordinates. In the issues which he, at any given time, considered crucial, regardless of their character (great or even trifling) he not only assigned specific tasks to individuals but meticulously outlined the ways and means of accomplishing these tasks. In situations in which he recognized that he could afford to do so, even with issues of great importance, he merely outlined the perimeters, leaving the initiative and details to others. He did not divide the issues into important and trifling; practically, however, he attempted to influence everything.

He was particularly fond of creating various types of programmatic documents. In the first half of the seventies (as he in earnest commenced to spread his wings as the Minister of National Defense), there were tens of programs, plans, principles, statutes, instructions, manuals, etc. of various types issued under his direct leadership. Nearly every one of those documents had a mark of his personal corrections and completions, and many were simply re-edited by him. He was very proud of this and as the government's Prime Minister he transferred these methods to the state-wide forum.

He inoculated his subordinates with the classical military methods of management and command via the established chain of command. He, himself, on the other hand, very often departed from these principles, sending some of his
directives, orders or instructions, and even texts of his proposals which he considered particularly good, down two or three steps below, bypassing the chain of command. When advised about the negative aspects of such procedure he flinched, maintaining that his recommendations often failed to reach lower levels, were distorted or vulgarized.

b) Did JARUZELSKI only delegate authority to a few trusted subordinates? Did he personally specify to whom he was delegating authority or was it just passed down the chain of command to the appropriate person?

JARUZELSKI avoided creating an informal division between trusted and less trusted subordinates. As the Minister of National Defense, he was on first name basis with all Vice-Ministers and chiefs of various central organs of the Ministry of National Defense (i.e., he called them by their first names, and they addressed his as "Citizen General") but he referred to them with respect. He delineated the limits of their authorities in such a manner that none of them could dominate the others. Even the Chief of General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces who, by virtue of his position coordinated the activities of all central institutions of the Ministry of National Defense, had no exceptional privileges and could only politely ask all Vice-Ministers to do something.

Delegation of his authority was chiefly resolved by JARUZELSKI through his selection of the cadre and through the delineation of authority of individuals in specific positions, a system to which he himself subsequently adhered.

In not quite a decade, he neutralized in MND nearly all of his potential rivals and exchanged nearly all of the command staffs of the
Commanders of Military Districts and Branches of the Armed Forces down to Divisional and independent units inclusively. In the same vein, he introduced a system of a "carousel of positions", frequently rotating cadre personnel at the same level of command, so that no one could feel too certain in his position.

Despite the fact that JARUZELSKI attached considerable weight to the intellectual qualities of the cadre, he did not push real intelligent personalities for specific posts, if they were simultaneously independent thinkers. Rather, he kept such people in a shadow, demanding from them a variety of opinions, expertise, analysis and appraisals, or resolutions of definite problems. He manned the key positions of the armed forces with mediocre but loyal people, particularly favoring the so called "ax-men", i.e., those who were ruthless and despotic.

JARUZELSKI could not, however, permit himself to make all decisions about the cadre. In his immediate entourage there remained at least two Vice-Ministers who worked for both sides, Soviet and Polish. To the first protege of Moscow, Lt. Gen. Jozef URBANDOWICZ, he had to give the high post of his first deputy. To neutralize his influence, however, JARUZELSKI limited his authority almost entirely to complaints and grievances, initiatives and innovations. To the second protege, Lt. Gen. Eugeniusz MŁCZYK, the Inspector General of Training and the wartime front commander of the Polish Armed Forces, he gave no authority to command these forces in peacetime.

At the time of the social crisis in Poland in 1980/82 and the changes in the highest echelons of the power elite in the PPR, inspired by the USSR, JARUZELSKI's mistrust of his closest co-workers increased markedly. He did not, however, permit this to be apparent, but limited the group of his
however, permit this to be apparent, but limited the group of his really
tested closest associates to his old and tested friend Gen. WIWICKI
(responsible for the direction of the armed forces and the preparation of
martial law), and the Chief of Cabinet of MND, subsequently the Chief of
the Directorate of the Council of Ministers, Maj. Gen. Minister, Michal
JANISZEWSKI (responsible for directing the Council of Ministers). Gradually,
as the economic problems came to the fore, he included in this group civilian
specialists - Alfred COREWODA and Władysław BAKA.

With the exception of Gen. WIWICKI, to whom JARUZELSKI granted, by a
special order, an authority to direct activities of the whole national defense
establishment, not one of the other people could take advantage of any
authority or entitlements not connected with their officially assigned
responsibility.

c) Did JARUZELSKI personally follow-up on status checks and the
final results of delegated assignments, or did he just expect that things
would be done?

JARUZELSKI took over the typical characteristic of the leadership of
the system which attached much more attention to the declared content rather
than to actual deeds. He believed in the magic of words and even more in the
causative power of various programs, plans, directives and legally formal,
printed regulations. As the Chief of the General Staff, subsequently, as the
Minister of Defense, and also already the Prime Minister of the PPR, he
directed all his unconsumed energy toward the shaping of the future,
distinctly closing his eyes on reality. He treated controls and examination of
reality as only instrumental. On the one hand, he made a great issue about the
need for effective inspections and scrupulous accounting by his subordinates.
of their assigned tasks and organized spectacular control activities. On the other hand, he created a defined climate for formalism and the subordination of any results of inspection to the previously prescribed fiction.

In the past, JARZELSKY supposedly had earnest intentions for a more diligent follow-up of the implementation of the program-tasking paper work created at the level of MND. An example of this could be the fact that one of his first moves, as the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, was the introduction into the armed forces of a system of accountability of the commanders for their assigned tasks. This system survives until today in the armed forces, and it is now also being transplanted to the civilian authorities.

In the framework of this system, the Vice-Ministers of Defense, commanders of Military Districts and branches of the armed forces, had to account annually before the Minister of National Defense about the implementation, by their subordinate institutions and armed forces, of the assigned tasks. In turn, these subordinates, called to account their subordinates, in a similar fashion, and all this went through the chain of command down to the lowest level.

While at the lowest level this accountability made some sense (because the commanders remained directly involved with their troops and knew what went on), at the level of the MND this was a pure fiction.

This fiction stemmed from the fact that the accounting documentation was generally prepared on the basis of the reports by those who were called to account. Since there were neither appropriate methods nor personnel to verify these reports, the appraisal of the individual who submitted his report depended, in a large measure, on his ability to prepare certain reports rather
than on the actual status quo.

JARUSZELSKI did not personally check the reports, studies and implementation of tasks that he assigned. He never had time for it. If he did go any place, it was more of a gala performance with all the ceremonies rather than an actual investigation of the situation at hand. In general, he avoided locations where he could find the proverbial bottom. As the result he was poorly informed not only about the realities of the life in the country but also what really transpired in the armed forces. In this fashion, living in a fiction, he created new fiction. The commands of the military districts and of branches of the armed forces, as well as many commanders of lower echelons, accepted JARUSZELSKI's tasking with great reservations, claiming that the tasks were unrealistic, "tailored" rather for the next, the twenty-first century. Even within his closest circle, it was said that he "has his head in the clouds", that he sees the country and his armed forces more along the lines of his idealistic wishes and desires than for what they really are. The criticism, however, rarely reached the mentor since he was not inclined to listen to it and, if it was in any way connected with a judgment of his decisions, could very well spell the beginning of the end of the career of anyone who dared to express such criticism.

With this background JARUSZELSKI rid himself astutely of Gen. Jozef KAMINSKI, one of the oldest and the most experienced generals. KAMINSKI, even though in the past he was once JARUSZELSKI's commander, never had any ambitions to take over the post of the Minister of the National Defense. As an old hand, however, he did question certain moves of JARUSZELSKI as impractical. In response he was at first transferred from the Commander of the Pomeranian Military District (which he commanded for more than ten years and where he
felt strong) to the command of the Silesian Military District (where he had first to win his post), then to the post of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Combined Armed Forces in Moscow. After completion of his assignment in Moscow he had to satisfy himself with the post of the Commandant of the General Staff Academy.

It appears certain that JARUZELSKI was, to a certain degree, afraid of KAMINSKI as his potential rival, but the real beginning of the end of KAMINSKI's career commenced at the moment when the latter started to question JARUZELSKI's realism. JARUZELSKI, as he grew in power, became more and more convinced about his own infallibility, and considered every criticism, even an attempt to portray reality as it was an attempt to undermine his position.

During the crisis in Poland, at the Party conferences in the military, it was pointed out to JARUZELSKI that he departed from reality, a statement which he found shocking. He had accepted this criticism almost with humility, but there were few indications that he drew any appropriate consequences from it or that he had changed.

5. What was JARUZELSKI's decision-making style?

JARUZELSKI was the type of a commander who gave the impression that he had met all the challenges half-way, and had not only a strictly defined, experienced attitude toward all the problems under consideration but also ready solutions.

These were, however, only appearances. In reality he was most cautious in undertaking any decisions, great or small. He never made decisions perceptually, especially under the influence of emotions.
or passion. Difficult decisions took their time to ripen with him, at times for weeks (for instance, the government provocation in BYDGOSZCZ in the spring of 1981), and the most difficult (the imposition of martial law) took several months.

Though he gladly took advantage of the advice and expertise of the specialists and listened to the proposals of his closest associates, it was a rare occasion when he was influenced by their views. His decisions were independent and resulted rather from his own contemplations, frequently in solitude.

He shied away from schematic and simple decisions. Rarely, if ever, did he see only one solution. On the contrary, it became nearly a rule that he indicated various alternative solutions or only defined certain directions of relevant activities, leaving for himself a margin of freedom for subsequent changes, depending on the development of the situation.

a) Did JARUZELSKI meet with his advisers and jointly discuss options in detail and then jointly select the best option, or did he have advisors present options from which he then selected his choice?

In his day-to-day leadership activity over the armed forces and later over the ship of state, JARUZELSKI did not avoid personal meetings with his advisers to discuss concrete issues with them. In fact, he used this very method during the crisis, at the time when the sensibility of certain issues did not favor their discussion in a wider circle. This was, however, an unusual period in history and the issues involved were also unusual. In general, JARUZELSKI distinctly preferred a formal examination of issues and discussions of various options at the meetings of the so called "collegial organs" such, which pertained to the armed forces, at the meetings of the
MND team and the Military Council of MND; and those concerning national issues, at the meetings of the Committee of the Defense of State, government's presidium and the Council of Ministers.¹

His particular attachment to formalism and bureaucracy was probably the deciding factor in his application of this method of wielding power and of formulations of decisions. To a large extent, it also stemmed from his personal predispositions. JARUZEWSKI absorbed written texts like lightning; he had an outstanding visual memory, and he was especially well disposed toward completed documents. He was not particularly effective in discussions, oral considerations or in unexpected situations. Moreover, he needed time to think through every important issue. Placing these issues on the table of the "collegial organs"—meetings, he was winning both, his strongest and his weakest points.

Echelons, responsible for the specific issues, were duty-bound to report in writing seven to ten, and sometimes more days before the meeting. These studies were then researched and commented upon initially by the specialists of the office of the Minister of Defense or the office of the Council of Ministers and then submitted to JARUZEWSKI with the so-called information bank".² JARUZEWSKI perused these data in detail, demanding as needed, explanations of various issues. In the seclusion of his office he formulated his own view of the problem and designed the outlines of his eventual decisions or directions for further tasks.

During the meetings of the collegial organs the discussions about problems or issues took place in a fashion in which the the chief of the specific activity presented a brief introduction (most frequently he presented the status quo and reported corrective action and last minute
changes to his own resolutions). Thereafter, the participants of the meeting posed questions and expressed their own views. JARUZELSKI took no part in the discussion, merely summarizing it and expressing his own position. JARUZELSKI's pronouncements were very lengthy and at times exceeded the total time of the comments by all other participants. He always spoke extemporaneously using the materials prepared for him by the office of the MND or the office of the Council of Ministers and his personal notes.

Rarely, if ever, did he express his categorical views about a specific option for a solution. I know of no case in which he would tell anyone from his entourage that he was wrong or that his proposals were unacceptable. He proposed what he liked, remaining silent about the options which he opposed. An exception were the issues which he approved on the spot. In the majority of the cases he provided recommendations about the directions which ought to be followed in the tasks of the preparation of the issue for a final decision. The final decisions were considered by him in solitude. He entered his own corrections and supplements, and signed an appropriate executive document or approved minutes of a meeting of the collegial body, adding his own fine points or recommendations.

b) Did he withdraw from others when difficult decisions had to be made and then decided in solitude?

Yes. This was especially typical during the socio-political crisis in Poland when attempts were being made to push toward him methods of resolution of social conflicts which did not fit with his estimates of the situation. In this period it was not difficult to notice that he was torn internally when on the one side he shared the decision of the Soviet
leadership about liquidation of "SOLIDARITY", and on the other, he saw initially no chances of implementation of this intent. He distinctly avoided any contacts when he sensed that he would be subjected to pressure. He literally hid from KULIKOV, inter alia, and met with him only then when he had no other choice. He had no desires for meetings and telephone calls from certain Party activist hardliners, such as Stanislaw KOCIOLEK. In the initial phase of the crisis, JARUZELSKI prepared the most difficult decisions together with Stanislaw KANIA. After the VIII Extraordinary Party Congress (in July 1981), after which the Russians dropped their half-hearted support for KANIA, JARUZELSKI made his own decisions.

6. In staff situations in which JARUZELSKI was in overall command (in the field), were his decisions usually cautious and conservative? How so or how not so?

In contrast to problems of political and socio-economic nature, with which JARUZELSKI moved very carefully and with which he demonstrated adherence to required schemes, in staff situation, when he acted as the overall commander of troops in the fields, he was a courageous innovator who went far beyond schematic canons and ossified Soviet operational and tactical art. He was always very well informed about the situation and reacted to it operationally, making quick decisions. Orally, at every opportunity, he paid homage to the Soviet military thought; in practice, though, he continually searched for something new which not always fitted the imagination of Soviet generals, and at times even evoked horror in them. For instance, in the maneuvers "LATO-74" he made a decision to change the direction of the Polish operational front by almost 30 degrees since there arose a chance of attacking the remote wing and the rear of the 7th US Field Army. In field exercises he
commended commanders for their originality and action which surprised the opponent, simultaneously fighting routine and conventionalism.

7. What was the overall staff opinion of JARUZELSKI as leader?

As a man?

JARUZELSKI's reputation as a leader differed and changed with the passage of time and events.

His immediate entourage and the higher echelons of the Central Organs of MND evinced the least faith in his leadership talents. In general, he was accused of having "views which changed with the weather" and of being a career-seeking man. People commented in one breath about his procrastination and inability to make decisions, preoccupation with details, formalism and bureaucracy. Frequently he was accused of cowardice.

He did, however, impress the middle ranking and junior officers who knew him better from his flashy side, from his rhetoric full of zeal and faith in his endeavours, rather than from his actual deeds which often contradicted what he was saying. What also influenced the relationship of the middle level and junior officers to JARUZELSKI was the fact that in many instances he was opening for them realistic visions of promotions and development.

As the crisis developed it was easy to notice that the opinion of the cadre about JARUZELSKI was shifting in his favor. His famous, full of restraint and measured presentations in the SEJM of the PPR (immediately after his acceptance of the office of the Prime Minister), and the Ninth Extraordinary Party Congress, not only quieted down the criticism but also won him many fervent followers. The greatest popularity, however, gave him the attack of the hardliners of the Party, led by GRABSKI and MOCZYK inspired
by the USSR and intended to remove JARUZELSKI and KANIA from power which ended in failure. It was a turning point in which he was ennobled in the eyes of the officers as an independent leader who really cared about the interests of the country. One could say that after this incident the only group of adversaries which remained were the generals and officers tied to Moscow and the Party hardliners clustered around MOLCZYK, KREPSKI (at that time the chief of the Air Force) and JASINSKI (Deputy chief of General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces).

It seems to me that there was a lesser disagreement in the opinions about JARUZELSKI as a man among the officers of the Central Institutions of the MND.

Despite the pompous style of life, as I already mentioned, he was extremely tactful and polite. He addressed all as "comrades" or "citizens", colonel, captain, etc. At the moment of greeting someone (which he incidentally liked very much) he stopped before each in a position of attention, inclined his head which gave the impression that he noticed in everyone, regardless of rank, a man, and a comrade-in-arms. He was admired for his diligence and for not succumbing, as many other dignitaries did, to the temptations of luxury. Also, no one could accuse him of unethical or immoral behavior.

8. Did JARUZELSKI treat his subordinates equally or show favoritism? How? For what reason did the favoritism occur?

JARUZELSKI reposed a different degree of trust in different subordinates, though the degree of his trust did not influence his treatment of these people. Clearly, however, in the moment in which he caught the wind in the sails of history, he began to push into the first place, in the assessment
and reward of his subordinates, such factor as: loyalty, obedience, and instant response to any tasking. He loathed, however, simple boot-licking though, he was eager to search for confirmation of his greatness by officers. If one were aware of this weakness of his and knew how to use it adroitly, he could count on preferential treatment. Such specific preferential treatment was, however, reflected by JARUZELSKI via official personnel decisions since he had never shown any favoritism. His demands upon all were high and identical, and he never indulged anyone. He valued good work and looked upon the results not with a view who did the work but rather how it was done.

Afraid of any slanderous remarks about favoritism he frequently bypassed official recognition of people who constituted his immediate entourage. Thus, for instance, his officers for special tasks, aides-de-camp and security personnel received a lesser number of promotions, awards and other recognition than their contemporaries in other central organs (instytucje centralne) of MNSD. Even these people were rewarded to a lesser extent than the people in military units and in the field. He had his favored officers for special tasks, aides-de-camp, drivers, a stewardess and even a waitress, but these people never took advantage of any particular privileges.

If he felt that someone from his personal entourage deserved a particular recognition he would bring him a hare from his hunting trip, or a wild duck or a pheasant but he would not promote the person earlier than it was prescribed in the mandatory "Operational Personnel Principles" (Zasady Dzialania Kadrowego).
9. Were there any occasions when JARUZELSKI became emotional (e.g. angry, upset, highly anxious, etc)? What did JARUZELSKI do?

JARUZELSKI was a staid type who, in general, controlled any external manifestation of his emotions. Favorable, satisfying situation and personal successes he acknowledged by an almost unnoticeable relaxation. In settings and situations which were unpleasant for him or complicated, he was relatively calm and composed.

Despite the outward calm and external composure it was not difficult to see that he easily became nervous for trifling reasons. Generally, he was irritated by the low quality (in his judgment) of the documents and materials submitted to him for approval. In such instances he reacted in a curt and tart manner such as: "It is difficult to believe, General, that you have read this!" Or, "I am concerned about the activities of the echelon which prepared this for you, comrade General. Please look into this and draw appropriate conclusions!" Or "This is just cotton!" (he would so describe voluminous material without real content); "This is just broken stones" (which meant that there were some redeeming thoughts but they were disorganized, etc.)

At the time, when he was the Minister of National Defense he was most frequently upset about the conflicts in the relationship between the military and the society (if there were any unfavorable to the military article in the newspaper, complaints about the military submitted to the Central Committee the FOWS, soldiers' brawls in public places, etc). These conflicts were also caused by the so called "unusual accidents", in which because of lack of supervision or somebody's carelessness lives and valuable military equipment were lost (aircraft accidents, weapons and explosives warehouses fires, and
accidental deaths during military training, etc.

Similarly, he would become angry whenever weapons or classified documents were lost or someone disclosed classified information.

Upset and losing his composure he would react sharply, but would not explode. Commanders were afraid to see him in such situations because the discussions would be long and unpleasant. He accepted no excuses and his remarks were brusque and far reaching. Such discussions, however, never offended anyone's dignity. He was also very restrained in punishment.

JARUZELSKI did not smoke, though, in moments of extreme nervousness he would ask for a cigarette and smoked it as if he were a regular smoker. One could also notice that in moments of extreme psychological tension he limited his contacts and attempted to regain composure in solitude.

There is, though, a separate chapter of JARUZELSKI's behavior connected with the social crisis in Poland and his taking over of the office of the Prime Minister and subsequently also the office of the First Secretary. Without any doubt it was the period of nearly uninterrupted stresses and the greatest psychological tensions. He had undergone then a significant change. Before all, he lost his characteristic self-assurance. Once, he was even close to a breakdown. It happened in the last days of November 1980, when the Soviet side demanded from him cooperation in conjunctions with the introduction of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact in Poland at the beginning of December 1980.

I could not observe him at that time since he isolated himself completely from the rest of the world. I know, however, from the comments of Maj. Gen. Tadeusz HUPALOWSKI, (then the first deputy of the Chief of General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces) who was called into JARUZELSKI's office
to be sent to Moscow to bring relevant plans from the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces and who said that JARUZELESKI was so upset that he swayed and could not utter a sentence. HUPALOWSKI said it directly to me: "Today, for the first time even, I talked with a shred of man who was once called JARUZELESKI."

Other people, from his immediate entourage who remained in contact with him described to me his then psychological and physical state in a similar fashion.

His state of listlessness and depression did not, however, last too long. From what I could observe, every crisis (and there were several until November 1981) released in him as time went by, additional strength and energy and strengthened his stubborness for the realization of his chosen goals.

In all situation JARUZELESKI was nervous before every one of his public appearances. Despite the fact that he took pleasure in delivering speeches, he was always afraid whether they would come out well. He worked on the texts of his speeches until the very last minute weighing nearly every word which he was to utter. Just before he stepped up to the speakers' podium there was no way to talk to him. Often, he was shaking. Finishing his speech he expected from his entourage opinions and views about the listeners' reaction.

10. Were there any particular types of situation in which JARUZELESKI would rely heavily on advisors and other types of situations in which he would not? Examples?

On the basis of the facts known to me, I could not single out any specific situations in which JARUZELESKI depended especially on his advisors and such in which he did not do so. It seems to me rather, that there were no
such instances.

He was always personally involved in issues which he, at the given
time, considered as a priority, transferring to others such which could wait
a while or those which he considered could be certainly well prepared by
others without his personal involvement.

For instance, in the period of time in which he became Prime
Minister, he turned all his energy toward the political and socio-economic
sphere delegating to SIWICKI the full authority for the preparation of the
introduction of the martial law. Despite the fact that he attached a great
weight to this act, since March 1981 (when for the first time he was presented
with the complex plans of the activities in that period), until 30 October 1981
(when he made the final decision in this case and commenced coordination with
the allies) he spent no more than 8-10 hours on this problem, mainly reading
and correcting the Decree of the Council of State about the introduction of
the martial law, and the relevant implementing documents.

While he considered the issue of the introduction of the martial law,
al of his attention was focused upon the political propaganda side and
the activities of the security forces and militia. He was, however, less
interested in the details of military operations.

In the period of time in which I had access to JARUZELSKI one could
discern certain areas in which he felt at ease without any assistance from
advisors, and other areas in which he depended more on his advisors than on
his own experience.

In the first group I would include, outside of the military issues,
Party ideology, foreign policy and partly internal policy, including
relations with the Church. In the second group was the key problem of the
of the power of the State: "SOLIDARITY". Here, JARUZELSKI took advantage of the advise of Mieczyslaw F. RAKOWSKI. In economic matters he relied more on the concepts of Wladyslaw BAKA and Alfred COREWOTA.

11. How did JARUZELSKI manage his staff meetings?

In the Polish Peoples' Armed Forces during JARUZELSKI's regime, as well as under his predecessors, there were neither traditions nor customs of calling and holding meetings (conferences) of the staff which would be chaired by the Minister of National Defense. There were, though, formal meetings of the so called collegial advisory organs, chaired by JARUZELSKI.

These collegial advisory organs were: the Ministry of National Defense Team and the Military Council of the Ministry of National Defense. 3.

In addition, as needs arose there were conferences and gatherings at the central echelon of the Ministry of National Defense, devoted to specific themes, such as: meetings about the ideological themes, counter-action against enemy propaganda (both subjects invented by JARUZELSKI), and conferences about rationalization of economic managements, etc. The hosts of such gatherings and their chairmen were the viceministers responsible for the specific segment of activities while the Minister of National Defence acted as a guest and, of course, the chief mentor.

Aside from this, a briefing of the leading echelon of the Polish Armed Forces took place once a year during which the Minister of National Defense summarized the past year and set the tasks for the next year.
11. (a,b,c,d,) Were they rigid and formal, or casual and easy going? Was there a strict agenda that was rigidly adhered to or was it flexible? Did meetings always start and end precisely on time? Was JARUZELSKI insistent on this? Did subordinates feel they could easily speak up or disagree with JARUZELSKI?

The meetings of the advisory collegial organs chaired by JARUZELSKI were always very formal and rather stiff. They were usually attended by the members of a given organ or persons invited to examine specific problems (most often their chief authors or experts). The list of these persons was approved by the Chief of Cabinet of MND. Places were taken in accordance with the prescribed protocol. There was always the same JARUZELSKI’s officer for special tasks who acted as a minute-taker and prepared an official protocol of the meeting.

Issues were discussed and examined following an agenda prepared ahead (at least a quarter of the year before). In over ten years period no one could cite a case in which an item was removed or postponed for later consideration, on JARUZELSKI’s initiative. Sometimes, however, JARUZELSKI agreed to make a change when a motion was made by a chief of the responsible activity, especially if something were unfinished or new events took place which required substantive changes and completions. He did this, however, with considerable resistance and evinced in such instances his dissatisfaction.

Meetings began punctually and ran along the strictly established order of the agenda. They were opened formally by JARUZELSKI who in his ritual introduction presented this very agenda (at times he even commented on the planned breaks), pointed out the goals of the meetings or most frequently
he underlined the significance of the problems under discussion.

He chaired the meeting composed, giving the floor to each in turn as they asked for it. I know of no instance in which he would call upon somebody to state his views. Also, rarely during the discussion would he pose questions. He would never interrupt anyone during a person's presentation. In principle, the subordinates could freely express their views. In practice, however, to my knowledge, differences of opinions arose only between the members of the collegial organs and I have never heard of an instance in which any subordinate would disagree with JARUZELSKI. If so, then such remarks were directed in a rather diplomatic form in the proposals submitted to him.

It was difficult, besides, to have a different view from JARUZELSKI since the latter always expressed his own views at the end of the meeting while he summarized the discussion.

Generally, meetings of the collegial advisory organs were for JARUZELSKI a form of a tribune which he used to transmit his thoughts and intentions downward to the armed forces. He was always very well prepared for it. His remarks were much more than a mere summary of the discussion. He did not like to slide over the surface of the problems. Rather, he usually analyzed them in details surprising the listeners as much with the accuracy of his observations, as with the originality of the solutions outlined by him. One could say that all meetings, conferences and gatherings formed one of the most important basis of strengthening his authority.
12. What were JÄRZELSKI's views on the PZPR? His attitude toward politics before 1980? How active a Party member was he? His interest in Central Committee activities and deliberations once he was elected to that body? Did he attend most CC meetings?

JÄRZELSKI was connected with the PZPR much longer and much more personally and ideologically involved that it is generally assumed.

He was identified by the conservative Party wing as a "camelion" since supposedly by changing the basis of his convictions he survived at least four sharp turns of that Party (1948, 1956, 1970, 1980). He not only did not fall off on any of those turns but on the contrary, indeed managed to improve his position each time. In my estimate this is only partly true. It is true that JÄRZELSKI did indeed survived all shake-ups of the Party but perhaps not because he changed his views but rather because he never voiced any extreme views about internal affairs, always remaining closely allied with the center. Moreover, schemes of all kinds were alien to him and he adjusted easily to new conditions and situations.

Without any doubts, the most important fact in his career was that his Party activities were limited mainly to the realm of the armed forces Party ideology and foreign policy.

He joined the PZPR or rather its predecessor the PPR (Polish Workers' Party) in 1947 at the time when the Soviet and Polish communists began to form secretly their cells ("yacheiki") in the Polish Peoples' Armed Forces. He, therefore, did not join the Party as a volunteer but, in conformance with the then applied practice was chosen and recommended by someone, and subsequently "at his request" secretly accepted.

The relatively late date and the circumstances in which JÄRZELSKI
joined the Party, can not by any means, be interpreted as an indication of his wavering. As an officer of Polish Peoples' Armed Forces he could not have joined the Party earlier for the simple reason that the Party had not yet been recruiting members among the military at that time limiting its membership to the old communists from the so called Union of Polish Patriots (Związek Patriotów Polskich) from the USSR, subsequently adding the activists of the Polish Workers' Party (PPR) from Poland itself.

There were only scraps of such information penetrating the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces at that time. These sources indicated that JARUZELSKI's membership in the Party was neither accidental nor career-motivated. JARUZELSKI was already earlier prepared for it ideologically and organically and there should be no doubt that his decision in that respect was purposeful and based on much earlier infused conviction.

In the early post war years, JARUZELSKI was fascinated with the revolutionary ideals and with the introduction of the new order in Poland. He was very active, often delivering relevant political speeches in the framework of his official duties and in the so called Social Work Circles. Later he became nearly a professional speaker at the meetings and Party training programs. His activity focused upon spreading and disseminating the theories of marxism-leninism, political economy and history of the All-Union Communist Party (bolshheviks') (Soviet-Communist Party). He revealed himself as a shining specialist in the critique of the social relationships of pre-war Poland, and in the condemnation of internal political opposition, and world-wide imperialism. He did not, however, involved himself in any internal in-

especially in condemning the so called "rightist national deviation", i.e. the GOMULKA-SPYCHALSKI group.
His particular talents in propaganda-agitation activities attracted attention of others and became one of the most important motives for appointing him in 1960 to the most significant Party post of the chief of the Main Political Directorate (MPD) of the Polish Armed Forces 5. and subsequently his introduction from the so called "key" to the Central Committee of the PZPR (PWP).

During the time of GOMULKA, JARUZELSKI had no great influence on any issues of the Party or of the State, in fact he never attempted any such thing. The dogmatic First Secretary needed neither advice nor counsel. He did, however, demand loyalty and obedience. JARUZELSKI understood this very well and concentrated all his energies on the development of Party's influence in the military, as well as on strengthening the authority and justifying the policies of the First Secretary in this environment. One could say that as the Chief of the General Staff, and subsequently the Minister of National Defense, JARUZELSKI felt himself to be more a Party activist than a military commander, devoting more time and attention to the Party's political activities than to purely military affairs.

He looked upon each issue, studied it and made decisions in the context of the Party's politics and interests, demonstrating with each step his dedication and faithfulness. He took an active part in all the meetings of the Central Committee of PZPR (PWP). Often, he took part in the meetings of various problem-solving commissions of that body, especially those with ideological and foreign policy issues. His activity during that period did not, however, go beyond his granting in the name of the military, of the wornout stereotype and faithfully submissive support for the policies of GOMULKA.
JARUZELSKI was shaken up by the events of 1970 in Poland and all indications point to the fact that he honestly hoped to draw lessons from these events for himself and for the Party. Attempting to rid himself of the responsibility which weighed upon him, in the light of the Polish legislation, for the bloody suppression of the workers' revolt on the coastline, he personally prepared a document in which he formulated his own evaluation of these events, and drew conclusions for the future (see Document Nr. PR-667).

Everything ended, though, on only good intentions. Despite the fact that after 1970 as a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of PZPR (PZPR) and the main supporter of GIEREK's authority, his position within the Party being much stronger, he never took advantage to use it for the implementation of his own conclusions from these bloody events. JARUZELSKI quickly submitted himself to GIEREK, even creating within the armed forces a sort of cult around the man. He regularly invited GIEREK to take part in the most important military undertakings (exercises, Party conferences) and for visits to military units.

On his own initiative he introduced, in the "Main Defense Tasks of the PPR" (Wazlwe Zalozenia Obronne PRL), the most important document which formulated official doctrine of the defense of the country, new legal basis which gave the Party and its First Secretary specific authority to direct the armed forces and the defense of the country. In the second half of the seventies, he took part in the behind the scenes attempts to change the constitution and establish in the Polish People's Republic, an official position of the President of the PPR, foreseen for the First Secretary of the Party.
In the seventies, JARUZELSKI supported uncritically GIEBŁEK's program of an accelerated development of the country and of construction of a new Poland. He took part in all meetings of the Political Bureau and of the Central Committee of the PZPR (PWP). I do not know if he spoke at each meeting and voiced his views. There is no doubt, however, that he was always very well prepared for it. The office of the Minister of Defense, the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces and other central institutions of the MND always had full hands with analysis and evaluation of the material and documents, which had to be studied and accepted by these organs.

From the documents which I myself prepared or what was prepared by my colleagues from the office of the Minister of National Defense and the General Staff, I know that all went well at the Political Bureau and that JARUZELSKI did not raise any voice of wisdom at these meetings.

13. What Were JARUZELSKI's Views on the Catholic Church?

The Poles are a nation of romantics and dreamers who often value their heroes not by what they are in reality but rather what they would like them to be. In 1980 and 1981 during the crisis in Poland a tale was spreading, first at home and later abroad about the appearance of new Konrad WSea, in the person of General JARUZELSKI, who once, when he was a young boy graduated from a convent school, and today with God in his heart is only waiting to free Poland from the chains of communism. As an indication of his real goals it was mentioned and it is even today being repeated in the serious political circles that JARUZELSKI restored certain religious freedoms in Poland (such as permission to build churches, radio transmission of Sunday masses) and the establishment of a dialogue with the Church.
In this little story (which I suspect is being spread not only by special propaganda of the Polish regime) the only truth is probably the fact that JARUZELSKI actually did attend a convent school. Since that time, however, many years had passed during which he became an "enlightened" marxist who is supremely aware that his ideology and practice can not be reconciled with the Church.

JARUZELSKI never hid his views about the Church from his military colleagues. He always expressed his views explicitly about reduction of the role and the influence of the Church in the PPR, considering the Church as the bulwark of the reaction (opposition) and backwardness. In practice however, he went much further since in the Polish armed forces the Church was not only completely eliminated but, violating the freedom of conscience guaranteed in the constitution, he applied repressive measures for religious practices against military personnel. In the years of 1971-73 there were 285 punishments by the Party for religious practices. In these, 89 punishments were given to officers, 28 to warrant officers, 89 to career NCOs, 12 to cadet officers, 44 to enlisted men and 13 to civilian employees of the military. A similar, in fact a higher number of punishments were given in the subsequent years of the seventies. The officers and NCOs, party members and non-party were punished not only for their own religious practices but more often for religious practices of their wives and children (for instance, religious marriage ceremony, participating in cathecism classes, catholic funeral at which a priest was in attendance, etc.). The most frequent service punishment for religious practices was a transfer to a lower service post, often also expulsion from the career service in the Polish Armed Forces.

The issues of religious practices by soldiers and the methods for
combatting such practices in the Polish armed forces were periodically
discussed at the meetings of collegial organs of the MND, the commands of the
Military Districts, and branches of the armed forces. All, what in the
innocent service language was called "immunization of the military against
influences of the clergy", was under the patronage of JARUZELSKI, who in this
respect issued confidential directives and instructions and insured their
implementation.

Could JARUZELSKI with such attitude toward the Church, toward
religious freedoms as was amply demonstrated in the military for nearly a
quarter of century, change suddenly in 1980/1981? There is only one answer:
No! He was and remained a marxist and a militant atheist. He was, however,
and still remains a good strategist who had been able to see immediate and
distant objectives, who scrupulately counts and gathers such forces which are
vital to reach these objectives.

Granting the Church in 1980 certain concession (at which time
JARUZELSKI's attitude was, if not decisive, at least certainly crucial) was
not a gesture of the authorities nor a sign of his will, but rather a dramatic
attempt to rescue the regime in the situation which for the Party and
Government appeared hopeless.

During the crisis, the Party and the authorities were opposed by ten
million members of the "SOLIDARITY" mainly from industrial and urban
centers. An unyielding attitude in sensitive Church issues could have added
at least an additional equal number of opponents from among until then still
passive catholic villages. Retreating tactically, in accordance with LENIN's
teachings, the Party and the authorities, neutralized the villages radically
so wed desorientation in the ranks of the catholic segment of "Solidarity", 
and won the support of the moral authority of the church hierarchy for the "social peace".

All of the above reasoning concerning the motives for the treatment of the Church by the authorities were not formulated by me but actually by JARUZELSKI who presented them almost literally as I did to the Soviet Marshal KULIKOV but in carefully chosen words, during the discussion of these problems three years ago.

This took place on 12 January 1981 at the time of the official meeting of the Combined Command of the Combined Armed Forces (ZSZ) with the leadership of MNO of the PPR, in which I personally took part. This formal gathering was intended for the signing of a document about obligations of the Polish Peoples' Republic to the Warsaw Pact. The Russians, however, used this meeting as a forum for the criticism of the conduct of the leadership of PPR in that period. Since the issue of the Church, inter alia, disturbed them, KULIKOV expressed a wish to view a documentary film about the Pope's first visit to Poland. During the viewing, KULIKOV behaved as if he attended a boxing match, loudly expressing his disapproval during nearly every sequence. He threw various remarks and questions to JARUZELSKI and other generals of the Polish military. JARUZELSKI was visibly dejected and was unable to retort. The only thing he managed to utter at the end of the viewing, were the above cited remarks which forced the Party and the Government to make concessions to the Church.

I am far from claiming that JARUZELSKI expressed at that time exactly what he felt or what he wanted to say, especially about the primitive methods of combattng the Church, suggested to him by the Russians (discrediting of clergymen, restrictions in building of religious edifices and religious
practices, application of repressions, etc.). Similarly, I do not think that he even intended to transfer literally his experience in combating the Church and religion in the military to the country as a whole. For this 
JARUZELSKI is too intelligent and he knows what consequences could such a move entail. For me personally, though, there is absolutely no doubt that his present flirtation with the Church is being dictated by the unusual situation in Poland, and will last as long as he will need the support of the Church, or as long as the Church will provide him such support.

One ought not rule out that knowing the influence of the Church in Poland, and being aware of the inefficacy of the heterofore applied administrative measures, he will attempt to arrange some kind of a modus vivendi based on a role of the Church strictly limited to purely religious functions.

14. What were JARUZELSKI's views on the Soviets?

a) Were there any incidents in which he tried to show up the Soviets?

There is no doubt that JARUZELSKI belonged to the most authentic adherents of a close alliance between Poland and the Soviet Union. He felt, that in the past this alliance provided the basis for the liberation of the country from HITLER's occupation, and was the deciding fact in the social changes in postwar Poland. He also felt that at this time this alliance represents the only and unfailing guarantee of retention of the independence and territorial integrity of the Polish Peoples' Republic. Moreover, he considered that the economics of Poland and the Soviet Union complemented each great perspectives for the economic development of the country.
He believed in the peaceful Soviet intentions identifying himself fully with the aims and methods of this power and its defense policy in the sphere of relations with the West and especially with the countries of NATO. He also, without any qualms, became involved in the export of the revolution, via USSR, to all corners of the world.

He recognized and honestly respected the so called special role of the USSR in the "Socialist Countries Commonwealth". He did consider, though, that as the revolution progressed in the specific countries of this Commonwealth and the socialist system becomes more solidified, the primitive Soviet interventionism in relationship with these countries ought to be successively replaced by the authentic leadership functions. He felt that the Polish communists have arrived at the level which not only predisposes them to to an independent leadership over their own state but also to exert certain defined influence on the Commonwealth as a whole.

He was upset by the treatment of Poland by the second echelon leadership of the USSR (senior generals and marshals) as if Poland were one of their own republics. The respect, however, in which he held this great power, nearly paralyzed him and he never undertook any attempt alone to stand up against them. In conflict situation he used his subordinates, while trying not to notice the contrariness or simply got over it in the course of daily tasks. At times he reported to some kind of a diplomatic nuance in a manner in which in a positive way he pointed out to the Russians how they ought to treat the allies from the Warsaw Pact.

I admit that in the initial period of my responsibility for cooperation with the Russians I had difficulties in understanding what he really wanted. For instance, I was taken back when he admonished me that
in the Staff study prepared by me for his remarks at the meeting of the Committee of the Defense Ministers there was an omission of a comment about the Soviet proposal on which "Polish side was duly consulted in a democratic fashion", for which we are very grateful. When I responded that nothing of this sort took place, he muttered as if to someone who just dropped on earth: "that is just the case".

Since I considered such conduct improper, because we were becoming participants in the Soviet deception, I shared my comments with the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, Gen. SIWICKI. He then explained to me that we had no other choice but to keep reminding them in a delicate way that they should do it.

JARUZELSKI knew Russian mentality and their sensitivity to criticism. Because of this he not only never criticized them himself but fought against the slightest appearances of such criticism on the part of subordinates. In only my own environment there were two incidents of victimized officers for their careless comments about the USSR. Colonel BAUER who criticized Soviet activity in Portugal (immediately after the "carnation revolution") was transferred from the General Staff to a remote garrison.

A nomination of my own deputy for the position of the commander of the 5th Armored Division was revoked for his criticism of the Soviet approach in armament sales to the Warsaw Pact countries.

In my opinion JARUZELSKI did not oppose criticism of the USSR by itself (which he himself in many instances shared) but he was afraid to allow any laxity in the discipline and the spreading of this phenomenon in the Polish Armed Forces, for which he could be held responsible. The officers mentioned above were punished supposedly not for the sole fact of criticism
but rather for the way they expressed this criticism which could have spread to wider environment eventually reaching Russians themselves. Had it not been for this threat the issue would have taken a different turn.

The writer of this study often allowed himself a relatively sharp critique of Soviet concepts and demands. JARUZELSKI accepted these criticisms, though, in a sour fashion since he did not like to discuss such things, but all ended well. I even have certain basis for my suppositions that my critical approach (to the extent it was possible) toward the USSR was one of the reasons for entrusting me with the post connected with the military cooperation in the framework of the Warsaw Pact and retention of me in that position for such a long time.

JARUZELSKI had no real secrets before Russians, but he did not like to be surprised by them. Because of this, he undertook various steps to reduce Soviet penetration of the Polish Armed Forces, and indirectly also of Soviet influences. With this goal in mind, he effectively opposed the reintroduction of Soviet military advisers to various echelons of the Polish military under a variety of covers as representatives of the Supreme Commander of Combined Armed Forces (ZSZ). The status of these representatives in the Polish Armed Forces which JARUZELSKI assigned to them was far removed from Soviet demands and statuses which were given to them by the German, Czech and Bulgarian commands. JARUZELSKI gave key positions to people who were not directly connected with Moscow. He also stemmed the unrestricted flow of information to the Russians about the situation in the Polish military.

In this respect, inter alia, he even dared to remove an officer of the Polish Forces, Col. ROGAŁA from the general Staff who systematically rendered accessible to the representatives of the Supreme Commander of the
Combined Armed Forces important military documents. He gave the Russians a free rein in contacting officers and soldiers of the Polish Armed Forces but simultaneously he confidentially required that representatives of the MND accompanied the Soviet generals and officers during their visits to the lower echelons of the armed forces.

JARUZELSKI had an excellent personal relationship with the deceased Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal GRECHKO and nearly the same relationship characterized by mutual goodwill and personal friendship with his successor, Marshal USTINOV. The Soviet leadership appraised the personal relations of JARUZELSKI toward the USSR in the "category of contributions of historical significance."

Based on this appraisal, Moscow reposed the greatest hopes for the "restoration of order" especially in JARUZELSKI. When, however, under the pressure of the population, the authorities kept retreating and JARUZELSKI delayed using the military until more favorable conditions would arise, the Soviet leadership considered him incapable of acting and undertook concrete steps to replace him and KANIA with more decisive people. JARUZELSKI received a series of reports from Polish generals and other officers who were prepared for it by the Embassy of the USSR in Warsaw and by the representatives of the Supreme Commander of the Combined Armed Forces (ZSZ) attached to the Polish military.

In my view, this was an excellent shock therapy which started changes in JARUZELSKI's attitude toward the USSR. It would be a misunderstanding to state that JARUZELSKI resorted to some kind of volte face in his estimates of the USSR as the ally of the Polish Peoples' Republic. There is no doubt, though, that he arrived at a conviction, not without certain basis, as it
appeared from the veiled comments of his closest friend SIWICKI, that the USSR is to repeat in the PPR, one of its scenarios from Hungary, Czechoslovakia or Afghanistan. This conviction solidified with JARZELSKI still more in 1981 when the USSR undertook further preparations in this direction. One of these was for instance the concentration of a Soviet armoured unit around Warsaw, without prior agreement of the official Polish authorities. This unit was in position to reach in only 20 minutes, the buildings of the Central Committee of the PZPR, Council of Ministers and the Council of State. Another special unit was designated to take over the Radio-Television Center within the same period of time. Also, without the knowledge and agreement of the Polish side, the Russians set-up on the territory of the PPR a special radio communications system to direct the operations of the Combined Armed Forces. In addition they undertook a systematic air delivery of troops and equipment to various parts of Poland. The pilots of the Soviet aircraft and helicopters did not subordinate themselves to the Polish Civil Aviation Service thus endangering even the civil aviation traffic. The height of contempt and disrespect or perhaps only blackmail, was the transmittal behind his back of tasks to the Polish Civil Aviation Service to secure the overflights and loading on the territory of Poland of over 300 Soviet transport aircraft five hours before the intended start by them of three airlift bridges with the USSR.

The Russians went so far in their contempt that the Soviet commanders...

The Russians went so far, in their contempt that the Soviet commanders in the Western military districts of the USSR, and even in the Moscow military district began to designate buildings in the whole territory of Poland which would be taken by their military commands.

All reports of the General Staff in such instances (and there were
many more) were accepted by JARUZELSKI without comments while he maintained a good face in a bad play. He always attempted to rationalize and to justify the Soviet action. There was, however, no doubt that under the influence of these facts he could conclude that the actual danger to the Polish State's separateness* even with a limited sovereignty constitutes the USSR.

15. How nationalistic did JARUZELSKI seem to be regarding Poland's future?

The fact that for the first time in the history of the Soviet bloc acts were committed in 1981 under national slogans and with national forces, acts which in the past in other countries had to be executed by the Soviet Army, caused not an insignificant confusion in the minds of the participants and observers of the events in Poland and began a wave of speculation about a possible nationalistic attitude of the main hero of these happenings, Gen. JARUZELSKI.

I believe it is unnecessary to prove, that in general, the events in Poland followed the exact requirements and instructions of Moscow, though, perhaps a little later and not exactly in the style then wished and still being wished for by the Soviet leadership. Can the personal influence of JARUZELSKI on such series of developments be an indication of his nationalistic interest in the future of Poland? Did he demonstrate such interest in the past?

Basing it on the facts from the period which preceded the martial law in Poland, there is no way to find even a smallest trace of JARUZELSKI's interest, even on a distant scale, in directing Poland toward the road of

*Translator's note. The author avoids the use of "Polish state's independence", since he as all other Poles, considers that Poland is neither independent nor sovereign.
self-reliant, independent from the USSR, national existence. One could say even more: all of his, very logical action, indicated that he was convinced that Poland, in the close alliance with the USSR could obtain everything, even achieve independence. In the same vein attempts in opposite direction mean betrayal of national interests since they could end with a catastrophe for the Poles, including the loss of independence. The slogan "achievement of independence", as it is proven in practice, has a clearly limited meaning, being in essence reduced to the state authorities obtaining greater freedom in the organization of national socio-economic life. It did not mean returning to the nation its sine qua non rights of deciding its own fate.

JARUZELSKI often resorted to the historical experiences of the Poles, though, he treated the national heritage tendentiously to justify the actual policy, especially the alliance with the USSR. In the historical trends he cited, he always exposed faults, weaknesses and the falls of Poland, ignoring the periods of her greatness and her prime.

He appealed to the patriotic feelings of his subordinates, but he himself bartered the fate of Poland. In the seventies, as the Minister of National Defense he kept signing allied understandings without any hesitation even though these further restricted the formal basis of Poland's dependence on the Soviet Union. JARUZELSKI demonstrated his total lack of interest in making Poland dependent on the USSR, during the 1979 negotiations and acceptance of the Wartime Statute of the Combined Armed Forces (2SZ). Several states of the Warsaw Pact had serious reservations regarding this understanding since the Soviet directives in themselves went so far as to deprive the national leadership of the Warsaw Pact countries of the rights to
participate in decision making about defense affairs, in this also in decision-making about peace and war, excluding even from the national jurisdiction the national armed forces transferred to the Soviet command. JARUZELSKI did have certain reservations in this respect but in the end he concluded that the interests of the Socialist Commonwealth had priority over the sovereignty of small and medium-sized countries, in contemporary times.

In the span of the last decade, JARUZELSKI evinced, without insinuations, that he is decidedly against the course of becoming independent of the USSR which Romania had chosen to follow. The Romanian signals, which I personally transmitted from Romania, and which indicated that they expected the Poles to take a more independent position at the Warsaw Pact forum, JARUZELSKI considered these nearly a plot or counter-revolutionary move and discarded the ideas with contempt. Without batting an eye he allowed himself however, to be dragged in by Russians into a "solidarity" campaign against the Romanians at the meetings of the Committee of Defense Ministers. Moreover, he expressed dissatisfaction when the members of the Polish delegation established any kind of closer social contacts with the Romanians. In the reports submitted to the then political and Party leaders of the Polish People's Republic (GIEREK, JAROSZEWICZ) he distorted and downgraded the Romanian position.

During the crisis in Poland he showed great interest in the Hungarian model and the height of his dreams, which he underscored many times, was to arrive at the level which that country reached in the economic field.

16. Were some of JARUZELSKI's personal attitudes highly moralistic or puritanical about how he or his officers should behave?
a. Did he insist on highly moral and correct behavior?

JARZELSKI was a moralist of a sort. On his initiative and with his decisive participation a special document was prepared and codified in the Polish military and titled: "The Principles of Ethics and Customs for the Career Personnel of the Polish Peoples' Armed Forces", i.e., a moral code of career soldiers. This code promulgated such general values, as inter alia, love and devotion to the fatherland, placing of interests of society over above personal interests, soldiers' honor, personal dignity, honesty, truthfulness, modesty, comradeship, equal respect for superiors and subordinates, respect for uniform and others. Simultaneously with this, the code cited examples of behavior in various social situations and environments, in service and at home, in public places, etc. If I remember correctly, there seem to have been some kind of commandments for do's and don'ts, as well as how one should react when someone else violated these principles of ethics.

The principles of ethics were supplemented somewhat by the armed forces manuals about internal and disciplinary matters, formulated with the personal involvement of JARZELSKI, as well as the continuing "Program of Development of Culture in the Polish Armed Forces".

JARZELSKI was not fanatical about the issue of ethics and morality but he would not let anyone who transgressed get away with it, in the long run. For instance, in 1968 he appointed Gen. Boleslaw CHOCHA as the Chief of General Staff of the PAF (Polish Armed Forces) being aware that his appointee had an inclination toward alcohol. JARZELSKI tolerated this and limited himself only to reasoning with him for nearly five years. When CHOCHA, however, disregarded these rebukes in a flagrant manner and disgraced himself, JARZELSKI removed him from his job.
In a similar fashion he treated one of his officers for Special Activities, Colonel Henryk Michalski. Jaruzelski was aware, in general, about Michalski's difficulties in his personal life and was not even disturbed by the fact that during a nearly decade of their cooperation Michalski was thrice divorced. When, however, his fourth wife filed a complaint that she was beaten by him, Jaruzelski transferred Michalski from his office to another position within the MND.

Already in the sixties, Jaruzelski began a campaign in the military against alcoholic abuses. He issued a series of controversial directives forbidding the sale and consumption of alcohol on military installations, including officers' clubs, and giving of parties during working hours. He did not, however, implement these directives with an iron hand. It also happened that Jaruzelski himself fell into the trap of his own directives when he gave a party of the Officers' Club of the 12th Mechanized Division to honor the Party dignitaries of Szczecin. An overzealous commander directed that drinking glasses be filled with watered juice. When Jaruzelski toasted his visitors he determined that the author of this "idea" vulgarized his directive and fired him on the spot.

Jaruzelski did not like banquets and parties, except perhaps the so-called "joint soldiers' lunches" at which wine was served. Official parties and banquets with the full choice of alcoholic beverages, took place only when this was required by the diplomatic protocol. At such time he drank himself but only when toasts were proposed.
b. How did he deal with corruption?

Since the Polish Armed Forces had a non-cash, central supply system, corruption, bribes or graft were marginal occurrences which arose very rarely and on a really small scale. More common form of taking personal advantages was using soldiers' labor in agriculture and forestry, in housing and industrial construction, and using military equipment and materiel for personal purposes. Estimated losses from these instances were not too great, often even laughable.

Only a few cases of bribery were noted, mainly for avoidance of compulsory draft. JARUZELSKI reacted rather sharply in all bribery cases and in all thefts of government property. All officers involved to whom acceptance of bribes were proven were sentenced by court-martials to long prison sentences. In addition, they were reduced in ranks by JARUZELSKI and released from career military service. Similar fate was dealt to those who resorted to theft of military property for personal gains. In the instances of minor gains from soldiers' labor or personal profiting from use of military equipment and material, the prosecutor's investigations were generally discontinued and the guilty individuals were punished via disciplinary action most often by being transferred to a lower service post.

It must be stated, in general, that JARUZELSKI did not create in this area any witch-hunt. There were hundreds of letters about abuses which were received in the offices of the Ministry of National Defense. These included charges against higher-ups mostly in a form of anonymous correspondence. Each case was studied individually and based on legal designation was investigated by either the Chief Military Inspectorate or by military prosecutors.
In JARUZELSKI's attitude toward economic crimes one could discern an application of a double standard or even a double morality. On the one hand a tight rein and harsh penalties for personal appropriations of government goods on a small scale, on the other hand creation in the fashion of the Party-State elite, of legal loopholes which made it possible for the high-ranking military personalities to do these very things legally. For instance, in the seventies all the Viceministers of National Defense and Chiefs of Central Institutions were given a temporary or permanent ownership of newly constructed or completely rehabilitated, at the costs of millions, government apartment buildings and homes. Even JARUZELSKI himself was unable to resist this pressure and used a villa which was rehabilitated and especially adapted for his residence at the cost of approximately one and half million zlotys.

b. How did he deal with discipline problems?

JARUZELSKI always preferred to rely on upbringing and preventative measures against delinquencies. He considered punishment as a last resort and personally resorted to it in exceptional cases, mainly by transferring offenders to a lower service post. He was certainly very understanding, and in many instances such affairs ended in only an oral reprimand. He did favor, however, recognition of people and awarding of prizes in the form of commendations, monetary awards, governmental paid furlonghs abroad medals, etc.

One of the examples of JARUZELSKI's conduct in disciplinary matters was the case of Colonel ANDROSIUK. This officer, despite being quite talented had in his service many so called ups and downs, i.e., he was quickly promoted and thereafter, as a result of some kind of misdeeds, most often because of drinking, he was being transferred to lower and lower positions. During one
of his subsequent "ups" before advancing him to a position within the General Staff, he was entrusted with a mission of participating as a secretary of the Polish delegation at the meeting of the Military Council of Combined Armed Forces (ZSZ) in Budapest. Suddenly, ANDROSIUK disappeared with all the documents, immediately upon landing at the Budapest airport. Since there had been fears that he might have been kidnapped, large forces of the Hungarian police as well as border guards and special services of several countries of WP were mobilized. He was ultimately found on the next day, totally drunk and sleeping in the city park with classified documents under his head. Since the affair became known outside of the Polish delegation the resulting embarrassment was crucial and JARUZELSKI suffered visibly from it. He became convinced that retaining ANDROSIUK on active duty made no sense because nothing seemed to help. Not wanting, however, to deprive him of retirement pay (which took place automatically in disciplinary cases), he recommended that he apply for release from active duty for medical reasons.

Simultaneously, the Medical Commission was advised "to find" medical reasons for his release. Ultimately ANDROSIUK was thus released. After a year, however, he concluded that if he were in active duty longer he might have had a chance to be awarded the Chevalier Cross of Polonia Restituta (this and higher awards entitled the holder to an additional 25% of his salary). In his case, his retirement of 85% of his active duty salary, would be increased to 100%. He, therefore, submitted his request honestly to JARUZELSKI who agreed to award him this decoration.

The example cited above is perhaps too extreme. JARUZELSKI not always allowed himself to be so magnanimous, though in disciplinary matters he always attempted, at least in part, to also be the defense attorney of the
accused to insure that the latter was not harmed.

17. What was JARUZELSKI'S life-style? Flashy and lavish, modest or spartan? Did he flaunt his power and authority? Did he ever abuse the power of his position? Examples?

It would be difficult to describe JARUZELSKI'S life-style as spartan, though certainly in comparison with other dignitaries of such level, his style was rather modest. He had no social or family life. He spent most of his time working in his office or participated in a variety of conference of the Party, government and the military. Occasionally, he would visit military bases during larger exercises. He began his daily work around 9 a.m., and excluding a two-hour lunch period which he generally spent at home, he worked until late at night not infrequently until 3 a.m. Before the work he participated in all physical exercises, planned for the leading cadre of the MND. He liked to swim in these hours, or to play volleyball. Once in a while, in the afternoon, in the MND projection room, he would view some kind of a film from the West which would not be shown in public movie theaters.

JARUZELSKI did not flaunt his power and his authority but, though, he attempted to be polite and well mannered toward all, he did make an impression of a puffed up statue. Except for the above example of his home which was supposedly forced on him, I know of no instance in which he would abuse the power of his position.

18. How did JARUZELSKI expect his subordinates to treat him? Very formally and deferentially, or collegially? Did this hold both for formal and informal settings?

JARUZELSKI wanted, before all, that his subordinates would respect him, but also that he would be liked. He never did, however, allow himself
any familiarity with subordinates nor did he ever try to insinuate himself into their good graces. He called only a few by their first names which meant that he considered those his closest friends. Never, however, even if he wore his pyjamas, did I hear anyone, including his friend SIWICKI to call him by his first name.

19. Did his aides, advisors, or subordinate fear JARUZELSKI? Why or why not?

He was feared nearly by all. In my opinion, the main reason for their fear was that he was very demanding and as a rule he had his own point of view on nearly everything, a view different from others. He who differed with him had to take leave from his post since there was no other choice.

II.
JARUZELSKI's MARRIAGE.

JARUZELSKI was married only once, in either 1957 or 1958, to his present wife. He met her at one of the performances of the State Artistic ensemble "MAZOWSZE", of which she was a member (a singer and a dancer). He married her supposedly out of love, which, however, did not pass the test of time. I know from certain sources that in the middle of seventies the marriage of JARUZELSKI was already "on the rocks". In 1967, his wife had a friend, a young physician, who provided medical care for their daughter. The supposed reason for the lack of harmony in the marital relations were the differences in their personalities and JARUZELSKI's preoccupation with his politico-military career. They spent their vacations separately, though JARUZELSKI was always with his daughter. He did not divorce his wife. Before
the end of the seventies there appeared to be a certain improvement in his
marital life (frequent telephone calls from the wife to his office).

II/9 How and why was JARUZELSKI selected as Chief of the Main
Political Administration in 1960?

I do not know any behind-the-scene machinations. In the early
sixties there circulated a variety of mutually exclusive gossips. In the
various versions there was a repetition of the background of the then strong
rivalry about the military influence between the so called "partisans" and
the staff of the regular army created on the territory and under the aegis
of the USSR.

As it is known, after the departure of Soviet Commander from the Polish
Armied Forces in 1957, the key military positions were given precisely to the
"partisans", that is to the people who entered Polish Peoples' Army from the
Peoples's Army and Peoples' Guard units created by the Polish Workers' Party
(PPR) on the territory of Poland (the Minister of Defense, Chief of Staff of
the Army, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, chiefs of military intelligence and
counter-intelligence, and others). Certain important posts were even given to
some pre-war officers, such as the Command of the Warsaw Military District,
key power position. The Russians were dissatisfied with this arrangement and
supposedly charged that SPYCHALSKI and GOMULKA discriminated against the staff
trained and indoctrinated in the USSR. This trend was being reversed sometime
in 1960/1961 in an attempt at the improvement of the Polish-Soviet
relations. One of the signs of this reversal was to be the appointment of the
chief of the Main Political Directorate. Moscow's favorite was supposedly
their friend URBANOWICZ while the candidate of the Party is (PZPR) ideologist
Zenon KLISZKO, to whom the chief of the Main Political Directorate was to be
subordinated in some fashion, was Grzegorz KORCZYNSKI (a Major General and at that time the chief of military Counter-intelligence).

Since the candidacy of URBANOWICZ, because of his limited thinking horizons, even by the communist standards, was unacceptable to the then leadership of the PZPR, while some kind of a gesture toward Moscow was called for, SPYCHALSKI suggested and received approval for the compromise candidate JARUZELSKI.

It is difficult to say how much truth there is in these stories, and how much fantasy. One aspect is certain, JARUZELSKI was not in position to seek this post. Such attempts never made any sense in the Polish military and if resorted to, often led in the opposite direction. Certainly, JARUZELSKI's public speeches at the Party meeting and conferences which in new terminology propagated the old GOMULKA's program of hard "labor for the welfare of the future generations", allowed him to break the trail for further military career. I do not think, however, that JARUZELSKI could even dream about achieving this position until it was offered to him.

JARUZELSKI had no formal training as a political officer. He did, however, progressed through all the steps of the political education within the framework of the programmed political training for military officers and generals. He had also supposedly undergone a two-steps Party training (an evening Party school at a division, and at a district level).

As the chief of the Main Political Directorate, JARUZELSKI strictly implemented the policies of the PZPR in the military. One of his achievements was the abandonment of the use of worn-out and embarrassing terminology of propaganda and agitation in favor of basing it on more scientific groundwork.
10. In general, what was his relationship with SPYCHALSKI, with GOMULKA?

In my view the relations between JARUZELSKI, GOMULKA and SPYCHALSKI were not only correct but even very good. SPYCHALSKI held JARUZELSKI in high esteem and he personally steered JARUZELSKI's career up to the minister's chair. Gomulka was, on the other hand, impressed by JARUZELSKI's obedience and respect for him. In the late sixties, just before JARUZELSKI's appointment the Minister of National Defense, GOMULKA's trust in JARUZELSKI began to wane. The main, if not the only reason, were the expenditures for defense. GOMULKA felt that the military was receiving a lot but was not managing its funds very well. There were certain indications that during the preparations of the PPR armed forces development plans for 1971-75 GOMULKA could suspect that JARUZELSKI was playing a dual role or that he poorly represented the interests of Poland in negotiations about the armament programs with the Russians.

In the summer of 1968 or 1969 I was personally a witness of GOMULKA's attack against JARUZELSKI. During the training of the cadre of the Party and State (secretaries of the Central Committees of the PZPR and ministers) which was conducted by the Committee for the Defense of State JARUZELSKI delivered the main paper about the defense of state. When in a part of his speech he used an argument, often employed by the Party's propaganda, that the PPR spends per a single soldier considerably less than a comparable NATO country, GOMULKA rose and in an explosion of a fury interrupted JARUZELSKI's remarks. He said that the figures cited by JARUZELSKI purposely distorted the budgeting picture of expenditures for armaments in the Polish Peoples' Republic. Continuing, he stressed that these figures belittle the vast national effort
Continuing, he stressed that these figures belittle the vast national effort in this respect. In a nearly half-hour exposition, GOMULKA proved that in reality the situation is the opposite of what JARUZELSKI wanted to picture. When JARUZELSKI attempted to apologize that he was being misunderstood, GOMULKA gave him a public reprimand stating that JARUZELSKI's knowledge of economic's left a lot to be desired and that he must either pull himself by his bootstraps in this respect or not attempt to discuss these issues. JARUZELSKI had to had eat crow and the incident was somehow assuaged during the training of the Committee for the Defense of the State, though, resentments remained.

11. What was JARUZELSKI role and involvement in the 1970 crisis?

In the first place I would like to contradict the gossips which circulated in Poland and abroad, about the supposed restrictions of the Minister of Defense in his competence and even his house arrest by the then political leadership of the Party. In this respect, I must state with full responsibility that nothing of this sort took place. On the contrary, it was precisely JARUZELSKI who at that time directed the use of the military on countrywide scale, through the then Chief of General Staff of the Polish Army Forces, Maj.Gen. Boleslaw CHOCHAJ.

I would like to note here that in addition to the maritime area of the TRI-CITY (ODYNIA, ODANSK, SOPOT) and SZCZECIN where 25,000 troops were used to disperse the rioting, practically all the armed forces were placed on the state of alert and assigned to direct blocking, law-and-order and defense action in all potentially endangered regions of Poland. Outside of
OPANISH, KRAKOW, POZNAN, WROCŁAW, OLSZTYN and BYDgoszcz. Concomitant with this action, the military took over the defense of hundreds of buildings which housed the Party's committees, and central authorities at provincial and cities level. In total, there were 61,000 troops assigned to direct action along with 1700 tanks, 1750 trucks, 8700 cars, aircraft, helicopters and ships of the Navy. The remainder of the armed forces, left in the barracks, formed reserves which were to be used depending on the further development of the situation.

At the central level there was, for practical purposes, no civilian crisis staff formed at least from the key members of the Politbureau and the Government of the PPR.

Strategic decisions were personally by COMULKA. Supposedly, some of these decisions were witnessed by the then Prime Minister CYRANKIEWICZ. JARUZELSKI personally took part in the general decision about the use of the military. Detailed plans about the use of armed forces based on JARUZELSKI's directives, as well as requests for troops from the field were prepared, executed, and up-dated by a special group of officers and generals of the General Staff, under the leadership of the then Chief of that body, Gen. CHOCHA. These plans were being submitted for JARUZELSKI's approval on the spot.

It is a fact that supposedly on the advice of COMULKA the command of military in the field was decentralized and military commanders were directed to subordinate themselves to the plenipotentiaries or local Party secretaries. The decision to use weapons against the workers in the maritime area was made personally by COMULKA. In the light of the above facts it is difficult
to blame JARUZELSKI directly for the tragedy in the maritime provinces. Viewing it, however, from the politico-moral side, or even from the binding laws of the Polish Peoples' Republic, the above facts can at best be considered as only extenuating circumstances.

12. Can you give background on the 1976 crisis and JARUZELSKI's rumored warning about the military not firing on workers.

I am not aware either of the behind-the-scenes political discussions about the use of force in 1976, or of the subsequently spectacular volte face in the direction of political solutions. From the prior access to documents, and from the behavior of JARUZELSKI at that time I can state with full responsibility that the warning ascribed to JARUZELSKI belongs to the realm of journalistic fantasy or that it is a "creature" of unknown origin of special propaganda.

JARUZELSKI was in no position to issue such a warning to the then political leadership of the Party, and he certainly did not register it with anyone. JARUZELSKI directed the Polish General Staff, without the least restrictions, to provide all necessary assistance and support to the security forces in RACKOM and URSUS which was executed instantly under his personal supervision. After 1970, he was very careful not only in the use of weapons but also in the use of the military forces in confrontation with the society which was expressed in a personally prepared memorandum by JARUZELSKI about the December 1970 events.

He considered that for this purpose there are the forces of militia and of public security which should be helped and supported by the military.

These thoroughly thought out ideas were expressed in "Principles of Cooperation of MND and MIA" a document prepared on his initiative and with
his decisive participation, classified as "Secret of Special Importance."

He wanted to implement these principles during the crisis of 1976 and did implement them, consequently having in his hands the totality of power during the planning and introduction of the martial law in Poland in 1981.
FOOTNOTES

No 1. page 18
I have purposely omitted the most important of the "collegial organs" which was the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the PuWP with which JARUZELSKI had an almost religious relationship. I was able to observe these activities under his chairmanship for nearly two months during the period of intensive preparation for introducing martial law and shifting the whole center of gravity and power to the Ministry of National Defense.

No. 2. page 18
In principle, the office of the Minister of Defense, and subsequently the office of the Council of Ministers, were required to submit a separate folder with a table of contents which provided key terminology, background, parallel examples, relevant developments and the other possible data relating to the issue at hand.

No. 3. page 28
The membership of the Ministry of Defense Team, aside from the Minister of National Defense who was the chairman, was composed of the vice-ministers, Chief of the Central Training Department, Chief of the Department of Cadres, Chief of the Internal Ministry Service (WSW), Chief of the Party Committee of the Central Institution of MND (ICMON).

The membership of the MND Military Council, aside from the Minister, who was the chairman, consists of all members of MND Team, all deputies of vice-ministers of MND, Chiefs of Central Institutions of MND directly.
subordinated to the Minister of national Defense, chiefs of operational
directorates of Central Institutions of MND (ICMON) as well as chiefs of
military districts and branches of Armed Forces.

No 4. page 31

Until the unification of PPR and PPS (Polish Socialist Party) and
formation of one marxist-leninist type Party, the activities of PZPR in the
Polish Armed Forces were illegal. Since the autumn of 1947 in the framework
of the so called "Party struggle for armed forces", under the leadership of
Soviet commanders and the political-training"apparat" attempts began to create
on a wide scale (in almost all military units) a secret organizational
structure of PPR.

No 5. page 33

Contrary to the accepted views (which stem probably from t
he fact that the Chief of the Main Political Directorate is frequently the
Vice-minister of National Defense), the function of the Chief of MPD is not a
government but purely Party position. In accordance with confidential Party
directives guiding the Party's political activities, the Chief of MPD is
subordinated to the Central Committee of the PZPR and in this respect, as the
chief of the department of the Central Committee directs the Party's political
activities in the armed forces. In this instance, the chief of MPD, even
though he wears a uniform and collects a salary from the military, is for
practical purposes a staff employee of the Party.
No 6. page 35

Fictional, though, beloved romantic character of the Poles created by the poet Adam Mickiewicz, under the same title, who reached the highest dignity by becoming the Master of the Teutonic Order for sole purpose of destroying the inimical to Poland order.

No 7. page 54

Serving in 1957 in Jaruzelski's division in Szczecin, I had nearly a daily report from the wife of my Chief of Staff, who was a telephone operator on the division's staff. She provided sensational reports of Jaruzelski's nightly telephone calls to his girl friend in Skolimow, near Warsaw, to whom he declared his love plotting his marriage plans.

No 8. page 60

Relevant documents about this memorandum are on file with this organization.

No 9. page 61

A copy of this document is on file with this organization.