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Intelligence Information Cable



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CITE TDFIRDB-315/01802-82

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DIST 29 JANUARY 1982

REPORT CLASS [Redacted]

COUNTRY POLAND/USSR

SUBJECT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE POLISH MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS
{DOI: 1981}

SOURCE A FORMER GENERAL STAFF OFFICER WHO MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS BASED ON HIS CONSIDERABLE PAST EXPERIENCE AND CONTACTS. HE HAS REPORTED RELIABLY IN THE PAST.

1. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE POLISH MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE {MON} AND THE MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS {MSW} NOW ARE "GOOD", BUT AT AN EARLIER STAGE, IN THE POLISH CRISIS RELATIONS WERE LESS HARMONIOUS. SOURCE ATTRIBUTES THE CHANGE TO TWO FACTORS: THE CHANGE IN THE MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS FROM MIROSLAW {{MILEWSKI}} TO CZESLAW {{KISZCZAK}} IN JULY 1981 AND THE CHANGING ATTITUDE OF THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP REGARDING THE NECESSITY TO USE FORCE AGAINST SOLIDARITY, WHICH BROUGHT WITH IT THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE COORDINATION AND COOPERATION.

2. EARLY IN THE CRISIS, RELATIONS AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL WERE MORE DIFFICULT, AS THE MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS {MILEWSKI} WAS MUCH MORE WILLING TO COOPERATE WITH THE SOVIETS THAN WAS WOJCIECH {{JARUZELSKI}} AS MINISTER OF NATIONAL

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
DEFENSE. THIS WAS AT A TIME WHEN JARUZELSKI AND FORMER POLISH PARTY LEADER STANISLAW KANIA BOTH WERE OPPOSED TO THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND. MILEWSKI HAD ACCEPTED SOVIET {KGB} ADVISORS INTO THE MSW AND HAD ALLOWED THEM INTO ALL PHASES OF MSW OPERATIONS. AT ONE POINT THE MON LEARNED THAT THE MSW HAD TRANSFERRED SEVERAL THOUSAND FILES ON POLISH CITIZENS TO THE SOVIET UNION, THROUGH THE SOVIETS ON DUTY IN THE MSW. THIS MSW COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIETS COMPLICATED JARUZELSKI'S POSITION AND MADE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR HIM AS HE RESISTED SOVIET DEMANDS FOR THE SAME KIND OF ACCESS IN THE MON. OPPOSED AT THE TIME TO MARTIAL LAW AS A SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS, JARUZELSKI AND KANIA WERE NOT PLEASED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE GETTING DIRECT ACCESS TO THE POLISH SECURITY FORCES POINT OF VIEW ON THE POLISH SITUATION. THIS LED TO SOME DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS.

3. UNLIKE MILEWSKI, KISZCZAK HAS A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH JARUZELSKI. GENERAL FLORIAN {{SIWICKI}} {CHIEF OF THE POLISH GENERAL STAFF} MADE A COMMENT UPON KISZCZAK'S APPOINTMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT "NOW WE WILL HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH THE MSW." KISZCZAK, WHO, AS CHIEF OF THE MILITARY INTERNAL SERVICE {WSW}, WAS ONE OF SIWICKI'S DEPUTIES BEFORE BECOMING MINISTER

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OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS, HAS, SINCE HIS APPOINTMENT, MADE IT A PRACTICE TO CONTINUE TO ATTEND MON MEETINGS TO IMPRESS THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP THAT HE STILL CONSIDERS HIMSELF A MEMBER OF THE GENERAL STAFF.

4. ALTHOUGH KISZCZAK'S APPOINTMENT WAS AT FIRST POORLY RECEIVED BY THE MSW, HE HAS SINCE WON THE CONFIDENCE OF HIS NEW COLLEAGUES. KISZCZAK HAS A SPECIAL GIFT FOR WINNING PEOPLE OVER. HE IS A MANAGER WHO NEVER DEALS IN DETAIL HIMSELF, BUT RATHER DELEGATES MUCH AUTHORITY TO SUBORDINATES. KISZCZAK IS A GRADUATE OF BOTH THE POLISH AND SOVIET GENERAL STAFF ACADEMIES. HE HAD PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS AS HEAD OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (Z-II) OF THE POLISH GENERAL STAFF. HOWEVER, KISZCZAK IS ALSO AN OPPORTUNIST WHOSE PHILOSOPHY CAN CHANGE EASILY WITH A CHANGING SITUATION. AS SUCH, ALTHOUGH KISZCZAK IS BASICALLY A JARUZELSKI LOYALIST, HE IS AT THE SAME TIME VULNERABLE TO SOVIET INFLUENCE. AS MSW CHIEF, KISZCZAK CONTINUED TO ACCEPT THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET SECURITY OFFICERS IN THE MSW, WITH HIS PRINCIPAL SOVIET ADVISOR IN AN OFFICE ADJACENT TO HIS OWN.

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5. IN CONTRAST, JARUZELSKI CONTINUED TO RESIST "PENETRATION" OF THE MON BY SOVIET OFFICERS. SINCE 1956, SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE POLISH MILITARY HAS BEEN LIMITED TO THE OFFICE OF THE "REPRESENTATIVE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE COMBINED ARMED FORCES WITH THE POLISH ARMED FORCES," HOUSED OUTSIDE THE MON IN A SEPARATE BUILDING ON WINNICKA STREET IN WARSAW. IN THE SUMMER OF 1981 JARUZELSKI REBUFFED A REQUEST BY WARSAW PACT COMMANDER V. I. KULIKOV TO EXPAND THIS REPRESENTATION BY AN ADDITIONAL 11 OFFICERS, TO INCLUDE, IN A BREAK WITH PREVIOUS PRACTICE, THE ASSIGNMENT OF SOVIET OFFICERS TO WORK IN PLACE IN THE OFFICES OF THE POLISH GENERAL STAFF AND DIRECTLY IN POLISH MILITARY DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS. JARUZELSKI ACCEPTED ONLY THREE ADDITIONAL SOVIET SLOTS, ALL TO REMAIN IN THE WARSAW OFFICE. [Redacted] COMMENT: FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON SOVIET PENETRATION OF THE POLISH MILITARY FROM THE SAME SOURCE, SEE TD FIRDB-315/01528-82, DATED 25 JANUARY 19823. MOREOVER, JARUZELSKI REJECTED THE IDEA OF ASSIGNING SOVIETS DIRECTLY TO POLISH STAFF OR TROOP UNITS. [Redacted] COMMENT: SOURCE HAS NO DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF THE ASSIGNMENT OF SOVIET LIAISON OFFICERS/ADVISORS WITH POLISH TROOP UNITS AT VARIOUS ECHELONS UNDER MARTIAL LAW.

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